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THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE IN
CANADIAN AGRICULTURE
MARIE-ANN BOWDEN*
Ultimately, Canadians will have the environment they deserve.
— Environment Canada1
I. Introduction
The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) in Canada is alive, if not well. Ensconced
in environmental legislation and touted by the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) as a principle which “has become firmly entrenched in environmental
law in Canada,”2 one might assume that the principle has widespread
acceptance and adherence among the various sectors of Canadian society,
including those engaged in agriculture. Such is not the case.
While the Supreme Court of Canada has expressly adopted the principle,
demanding that polluters pay costs of environmental restoration and pollution
prevention and control, lower courts have been slow in embracing the PPP.
Similarly, although environmental protection legislation at both the federal and
provincial levels incorporates the concept, the reference is often veiled and its
efficacy is impacted by legislation outside the environmental field which
protects selected industries, including agriculture, from application of the
principle. Moreover, the statutory manifestations of the PPP which do exist
are rarely the subject of prosecution within the agricultural sector.
With respect to policy, the PPP is an accepted norm within the federal
government, at least in principle, but there has been little manifestation of the
PPP in practice. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) in particular has
been reluctant to articulate the principle in its programs or policies.3 Although
the Minister of AAFC stated that “Canadians are increasingly aware of the
impact agricultural practices can have on environmental and human health”4
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1. See East Rouge Greenway Ass’n, Conservation Quotes 1, http://www.blackhole.on.ca/
quotes_1.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
2. Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of Env’t), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, ¶ 23 (Can.).
3. AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., AGRICULTURE IN HARMONY WITH NATURE II:
AGRICULTURE & AGRI-FOOD CANADA’S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2001-2004,
at ii (2001), available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/policy/environment/pubs_sds_e.phtml.
4. Id.
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and, as a consequence, prepared a national strategy for sustainable
development within the sector,5 the strategy made no reference to the PPP.6
In addition, AAFC and provincial departments of agriculture face differing
views from outside of government as to the meaning of the principle. For
example, some farm lobby groups promote alternatives which, although
supportive of sustainability, maintain that farmers should be financially
supported for positive environmental outcomes.7 The question of whether this
would simply encompass improved environmental outcomes, also known as
the “provider gets principle,”8 or shield farmers from internalizing costs
associated with their own environmentally degrading activities — a
repudiation of the PPP — is not abundantly clear in the literature.9
Clearly, in spite of diversity among stakeholders, with a commitment to
environmental sustainability comes recognition of both collective and
individual responsibility. There is no doubt that the PPP, while not a catch
phrase within the industry, is a principle the vast majority of those engaged in
the agricultural industry will soon embrace. At present, we must attempt to
draw the PPP into agriculture through environmental law reference points and
back-ending initiatives such as environmental farm planning,10 which
implicitly support the principle.
This article will highlight the application of the PPP in Canadian agriculture
by canvassing the state of the PPP in Canadian case law as well as federal and
provincial legislation within and without the agricultural field. Other
regulatory and policy instruments which embrace the PPP will also be
examined. Part II discusses Canadian PPP law on a national level, and Part III
addresses the connection between the PPP and environmental law. Part IV
discusses the importance of agriculture to the Canadian lifestyle and economy,
and how the PPP relates to them. Part V discusses existing policies, programs,
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. See infra Part V.C.
8. According to the provider gets principle, the producer would receive government
support for activities that help to improve the environment above baseline environmental
protection measures necessary to avoid harm. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agriculture and
the Polluter Pays Principle: An Introduction, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 4, 19, 36-37, 48-50 (2006).
9. See infra Part V.C.
10. Environmental farm planning is a pro\cess wherein individual farmers develop a
voluntary and confidential environmental farm plan to “systematically identify environmental
risks and benefits from their own farming operation, and to develop an action plan to mitigate
the risks. The EFP process allows farmers to set priorities for actions which address on-farm
environmental concerns, as well as those which serve the public interest.” Agric. & Agri-Food
Can., The National Environmental Farm Planning Initiative (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.
agr.gc.ca/env/efp-pfa/index_e.php.
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and laws which serve to defeat the success of the principle. Finally, Section
VI assesses the prognosis for the PPP.
II. The Polluter Pays Principle in National Law
A. The Impact of International Formulations of the Principle
For an international instrument to have direct legal effect in Canada, it must
be incorporated into domestic law through statute.11 The domestic law must
be passed in accordance with the division of powers and thus within the
constitutional mandate of the appropriate level of government.12 The SCC has
used Canada’s international commitment to environmental principles to justify
environmental legislation. In The Queen v. Hydro-Quebec,13 for example, the
court endorsed the preamble to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act
which recognizes that Canada “must be able to fulfill its international
obligations”14 by stating that “[p]rotection of the environment is an
international problem that requires action by government at all levels.”15 Even
in the absence of such incorporation, according to the DeMarco and Campbell,
Canada’s reliance upon international environmental law and policy (IELP) has
provided a springboard for judicial reasoning at the Supreme Court level.
[I]n nearly all of the recent leading SCC cases on environmental
law (none of which actually concerned an international law issue
directly), the SCC’s decisions on domestic environmental laws
have been grounded in a wider context — one that is often
influenced by IELP.
One of the main reasons that the SCC is able to draw on IELP as
frequently as it does is that it is now well accepted in Canada for
the courts to use unimplemented international treaties as an
interpretive aid when construing domestic legislation.16
11. See Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of
International Law by Canadian Courts, 2002 CANADIAN Y.B. OF INT’L L. 3, 22-23.
12. Jerry V. DeMarco & Michelle L. Campbell, The Supreme Court of Canada’s
Progressive Use of International Environmental Law and Policy in Interpreting Domestic
Legislation, 13 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 320, 321 (2004), available at http://
www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9388.2004.00412.x. Although true in the
case of implementation of treaties, according to DeMarco and Campbell, “[t]here has been some
debate as to whether customary international law requires transformation to have legal effect.”
Id.
13. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (Can.).
14. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 S.C., ch. 33 pmbl. (Can.).
15. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 215.
16. DeMarco & Campbell, supra note 12, at 321. Also, “[t]here is a general common law
principle that Parliament is presumed not to enact domestic law that is in breach of an
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Such was the case in Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of
Environment)17 where, in addition to the provincial legislative provision
applicable in the case, the Supreme Court of Canada canvassed other domestic
laws incorporating the PPP and then turned to the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development.18 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development was used as an interpretive tool to lend further
support to the PPP objective of the legislation.19
The Supreme Court is not alone in its willingness to look at international
law as a means of justifying Canadian legal and policy objectives; the impetus
for legislation embracing sustainable development in this country sprang from
the Brundtland Report,20 prior to formal recognition of the sustainable
development and the PPP by the Courts. However, it is the Supreme Court
which has
been consistent in its use of IELP as a source of interpretive
guidance. Despite the absence of explicit international law
questions before the Court and the fact that relevant IELP is often
only brought to the Court’s attention by public interest interveners
(as opposed to the main parties), the SCC has not hesitated to draw
on IELP in resolving domestic legal issues. Eschewing a myopic
view, the SCC has opted for a much more globally informed
approach to deciding environmental law issues of public interest
brought before it.21
Decisions at the provincial court level have applied the PPP, but do not
make explicit reference to it as a norm of international law.22 In practice,
international treaty.” Id.
17. [2003] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.).
18. Id. ¶ 23.
19. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Principle 16 reads “National authorities should endeavour to promote the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard
to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.” U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12,
1992).
20. World Commission on Environment and Development, June 8-19, 1987, Our Common
Future, U.N. Doc A/42/427 (June 16, 1987).
21. DeMarco & Campbell, supra note 12, at 330.
22. In the provinces of Alberta and Ontario, for example, see McColl-Frontenac Inc. v.
Alberta (Minister of Env’t) [2003] 336 A.R. 234 (Alta. Q.B.); In re Anvil Range Mining Corp.,
[2001] 25 C.B.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. Super. Ct. of Justice [Com’l List]); United States v. Friedland,
[2001] 40 O.R. (3d) 747 (Ont. Ct of Justice, General Div.); Fenske (c.o.b. Glombick Farms) v.
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lower level courts have not embraced international law, treating such
customary norms as exotic and not of practical application.
B. The Constitutional Context
Canada’s constitution divides powers between the federal and provincial
governments.23 Section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 articulates those
heads of power exclusively assigned to the federal government as including
defense and foreign policy, trade, and Indians and Indian lands.24 Parliament
is also granted the residual power “to make [l]aws for the [p]eace, [o]rder and
good [g]overnment of Canada,”25 as well as the exceptional right “to disallow
provincial legislation, and to declare local undertakings to be for the general
advantage and thus to fall under federal jurisdiction . . . .”26 Provincial powers
under section 92 of the Act include authority over “[l]ocal [w]orks and
[u]ndertakings,”27 which include education,28 property,29 civil rights,30 natural
resources,31 and “[m]atters of a merely local or private [n]ature” occurring
within the province.32
Jurisdiction over agriculture and the environment are shared areas of
constitutional responsibility, although the historical justification for joint
management of each is decidedly different.
Alberta (Minister of Env’t), [2000] 272 A.R. 247 (Alta. Q.B.), rev’d, [2002] 303 A.R. 356 (Alta.
Ct. App.); McCain Foods v. Alberta, [2001] 291 A.R. 314 (Alta. Q.B.); Graham v. Alberta
(Dir., Chems. Assessment & Mgmt, Envtl. Prot.), [1996] 46 Alta. L.R.3d 51 (Alta. Q.B.); Sarg
Oils Ltd. v. Alberta (Envtl. Appeal Bd.), [1996] 185 A.R. 118 (Alta. Q.B.); Kostuch v. Alberta
(Dir., Air & Water Approvals Div., Envtl. Prot.), [1996] 182 A.R. 384 (Alta. Q.B.).
23. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3. (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985). Municipalities are wholly creations of the provinces in accordance with
section 92(8) of the Act, which grants the province the exclusive right to make laws in relation
to “[m]unicipal [i]nstitutions in the [p]rovince.” Id. § 92. “Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians” are specifically included within federal jurisdiction by virtue of section 91(24) of the
Act. Id. § 91. Since 1867 additional rights have been established through the recognition of
inherent aboriginal rights, treaty rights, legislative enactment, and constitutional amendment.
For a detailed description of the source and extent of these rights, see NATIVE LAW STATUTES,
REGULATIONS AND TREATIES (Jack Woodward ed., 2005).
24. Constitution Act, 1867, § 91. For a thumbnail description of the division of powers
within the Canadian Constitution, see also Washington: Embassy of Canada, The Constitution
Act, 1867 (June 10, 2005), http://www.canadianembassy.org/government/constitution-en.asp.
25. Constitution Act, 1867, § 91.
26. Washington: Embassy of Canada, supra note 24.
27. Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(10).
28. Id. § 93.
29. Id. § 92(13).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 92A.
32. Id. § 92(16).
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In the case of agriculture, the Constitution Act, 1867, section 95 articulates
the shared authority.
In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to
Agriculture in the Province, and to Immigration into the Province;
and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from
Time to Time make Laws in relation to Agriculture in all or any of
the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces;
and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture
or to Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long
and as far only as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament
of Canada.33
“Environment,” on the other hand, is not mentioned in the 1867 Act, mainly
because environmental concerns were not at issue at the time of drafting the
Canadian constitution. Since confederation, numerous court cases, primarily
argued post-1980, have determined that environment is sui generis and a
shared responsibility that can constitutionally justify legislation by both levels
of government under several heads of power.34 Indeed the recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société
d’arrosage) v. Hudson35 upheld the right of municipalities to enact
environmental legislation in accordance with the principle of subsidiary, so
long as such legislation is not in conflict with provincial statutes.36
Similar arguments have been made regarding the desire to promote the role
of Aboriginal peoples in environmental management and protection, most
particularly those bands who have adopted land claims settlements and selfgovernment agreements.37
As a result, both levels of government — if not all four — are justified in
passing legislation or policy for environmental management in general, and
incorporation of the PPP in particular.

33. Id. § 95.
34. See The Queen v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (Can.); Friends of Oldman River
Soc’y v. Canada (Minister of Transp.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); The Queen v. Crown
Zellerbach Can. Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.).
35. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 (Can.).
36. Id. at 273-74.
37. For example, for a discussion of the role of aboriginal people within the context of the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, see KRISTEN DOUGLAS & MONIQUE HERBERT,
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, LEGISLATIVE SUMMARIES: BILL C-32: THE CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT, 1999 (July 5, l999), http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Bills_
ls.asp?Parl=36&Ses=1&ls=C32.
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C. PPP in the Canadian Courts
Certainly, most Canadians are aware of the polluter pays principle and
accept that society must collectively take steps to safeguard the environment.
Further, they believe that those responsible for environmental contamination
must remedy their specific problem and prevent further environmental
denigration by internalizing all costs associated with achieving that end.38
According to the Supreme Court, the Canadian psyche has gone beyond this
basic belief to recognize that Canadian concern regarding environmental
protection
does not reflect only the collective desire to protect it in the
interests of the people who live and work in it, and exploit its
resources, today. [But] [i]t may also be evidence of an emerging
sense of intergenerational solidarity and acknowledgment of an
environmental debt to humanity and to the world of tomorrow.39
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada, addressing the liabilities associated
with a contaminated site formerly owned by a large oil company, determined
the scope of application of the PPP as described in the province of Quebec’s
Environment Quality Act.40 According to section 31.42 of the legislation,
[w]here the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that a
contaminant is present in the environment . . . , he may order
whoever has emitted, deposited, released or discharged, even
before 22 June 1990, all or some of the contaminant to furnish him
with a characterization study, a programme of decontamination or
restoration of the environment describing the work proposed for
the decontamination or restoration of the environment and a
timetable for the execution of the work.41
In interpreting the section, the Court recognized the purpose and effect of
the PPP.
To encourage sustainable development, that principle assigns
polluters the responsibility for remedying contamination for which
they are responsible and imposes on them the direct and immediate
38. See David Boyd, Comment, Clean Up After Yourself, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Nov.
5, 2003, at A25. Although Boyd maintains that the PPP is supported in “theory” he argues that
practice in Canada is decidedly short in achieving that end.
39. Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of Env’t), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, ¶ 23 (Can.).
40. Id. ¶ 25.
41. Id. ¶ 14 (citing the Environmental Quality Act, R.S.Q., ch. Q-2, § 31.42 (2005), as it
was worded in 1998).
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costs of pollution. At the same time, polluters are asked to pay
more attention to the need to protect ecosystems in the course of
their economic activities.42
In ordering the appellant to remedy the contaminated site, the Minister was,
in the opinion of the Court, “performing his functions of management and
application of environmental protection legislation” in pursuit of the public
interest objective within the organizing principles of the Act.43 The public
interest in environmental protection included endorsement of the polluter pays
principle.44
The decision, believed by many to be the acceptance of the PPP in Canada
(as well as the doctrine of intergenerational equity),45 still left many
unanswered questions as to the scope of the concept and how it might affect
other cases.46 Subsequent cases have, at a minimum, confirmed the PPP as a
statutory principle,47 but the judicial scope of the principle is still being
divined.
The most recent case to address the scope and application of the principle,
Canadian National Railway Co. v. A.B.C. Recycling Ltd.,48 interpreted the
British Columbia Waste Management Act.49 The Supreme Court of that
province upheld recovery of reasonable legal costs incurred by the plaintiffs,
42. Id. ¶ 24.
43. Id. ¶ 38.
44. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
45. See Media Release, Sierra Legal Defense Fund, Top Court Upholds Government
Powers to Protect Environment (Oct. 30, 2003), available at http://www.sierralegal.org/m_
archive/2003/pr03_10_30e.html.
46. See Bryan J. Buttigieg & Michelle Fernando, The Supreme Court of Canada Endorses
the Concept of “Polluter Pays”-But What Does It Mean?, ENVIRONOTES! NEWSLETTER (Nov.
2003), http://www.millerthomson.com/mtweb.nsf/Web_Newsletter_Display_en?ReadForm&
PageID=mtte6a9bkh; CBC News, Imperial Oil Must Clean Up Site: Supreme Court (Oct. 30,
2003), http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/10/30/scoc_oil031030.
47. See B.C. Hydro &Power Auth. v. British Columbia (Envtl. Appeal Bd.), [2005] 247
D.L.R. (4th) 404 (B.C.A.C.), rev’g B.C. Hydro & Power Auth. v. British Columbia (Envtl.
Appeal Bd.), [2003] 229 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (B.C.C.A.); Canadian Nat’l Ry. v. A.B.C. Recycling
Ltd., [2005] 47 B.C.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n v. Canada
(Minister of Env’t), [1999] 3 F.C. 564 (Fed. C.A.); Workshop Holdings Ltd. v. CAE Mach.
Ltd., [2005] 40 B.C.L.R. (4th) 382 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); No. 158 Seabright Holdings Ltd. v. Imperial
Oil Ltd., [2003] 12 B.C.L.R. (4th) 226 (B.C.C.A.); Beazer E., Inc. v. British Columbia
(Assistant Reg’l Waste Manager), [2000] 84 B.C.L.R. (3d) 88 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); Montague v.
Ontario (Dir., Ministry of Env’t), [2005] 196 O.A.C. 173 (Ont. Super. Ct. of Justice); Jones v.
Delta (Municipality), [1992] 92 D.L.R. (4th) 714 (B.C.C.A.).
48. 47 B.C.L.R. (4th) 185.
49. R.S.B.C., ch. 482 (1996), repealed by Environmental Management Act, S.B.C., ch. 53
(2003).
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in this case Canadian National Railway Company and Canadian National
Railway Properties Inc., from the polluting defendant, on the basis that such
costs were consistent with the two underlying principles of the legislation —
the polluter pays principle and timely remediation.
Applying a contextual approach, I consider that interpreting “legal
costs” in s. 27(2)(c) of the Act to mean indemnity on a solicitorclient or special costs basis would be more consistent with the
purpose and scheme of the legislation. The reference in the statute
to “all costs of remediation” is used to describe not just legal fees
but all costs incurred. The intent of s. 27(2)(c) is to provide
indemnity for all costs of remediation reasonably incurred, and
must therefore include legal costs.
This approach is more consistent with the underlying principles
of the Act — “polluter-pay”, prevention of pollution and deterrence, and speedy remediation of contaminated sites. If an owner
knew that it was only entitled to partial recovery of legal costs,
which could be quite substantial, it would, in my view, be less
likely to incur the expense of remediation if it was only to be
partially reimbursed for the cost of recovering those expenses from
another. Making responsible parties liable to indemnify legal costs
in full also accords with the principle of “polluter-pay” and will
serve as a deterrent to pollution. While party-and-party costs may
not be inconsistent with the principles of the Act, I conclude that
indemnification is more consistent with those principles than partyand-party costs, and is therefore the proper approach.50
Similarly, in Montague v. Ontario (Ministry of the Environment),51 that
province’s Superior Court (Division Court), in interpreting the Environmental
Protection Act,52 began with the premise that the legislation included “both a
‘polluter pays’ and an ‘owner pays’ enforcement mechanism.”53 The case
addressed only the scope of these principles; the existence of the principles
was a given.54

50. Canadian Nat’l Ry., [2005] 47 B.C.L.R. (4th) ¶ 6 (emphasis omitted) (citing Canadian
Nat’l Ry. v. A.B.C. Recycling Ltd., [2005] 41 B.C.L.R. (4th) 317, ¶¶ 181-82 (B.C. Sup. Ct.)).
51. 196 O.A.C. 173. The case specifically addressed the ability of the Ministry of the
Environment to protect the environment from contamination through the use of a Directors
cleanup and discharge of contaminant prevention order. Id. ¶ 1.
52. R.S.O., ch. E-19 (1990).
53. Montague, [2005] 196 O.A.C. ¶ 1.
54. See id. ¶ 22.
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D. The PPP in Legislation
In reviewing environmental statutes across Canada, the PPP is found in
legislation beginning in the early 1990s.55 As noted by the Alberta
Environmental Law Centre, “[m]any Canadian [provincial] jurisdictions have
legislative provisions requiring persons causing releases into the environment
to take steps to control and remediate” the contamination, while other statutes
expressly include the polluter pays principle as a fundamental tenet of their
environmental legislation.56 The Environmental Management and Protection
Act (EMPA, 2002) in the province of Saskatchewan is an example of the
former.57 The EMPA establishes a comprehensive, and somewhat Draconian,
scheme to protect and remedy unauthorized discharges into the environment.58
Nova Scotia, on the other hand, includes reference to the PPP within the
section 2 purposes of its Environment Act.
The purpose of this Act is to support and promote the protection,
enhancement and prudent use of the environment while recognizing
the following goals: . . .
(c) the polluter-pay principle confirming the responsibility of
anyone who creates an adverse effect on the environment to take
remedial action and pay for the costs of that action . . . .59
The adoption of the principle at the provincial level is not particularly
surprising considering the position of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment (CCME). On January 29, 1998, the Ministers, with the exception
of Quebec, signed the Canada-wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization60
“to achieve the highest level of environmental quality for all Canadians”
through a framework and mechanisms to achieve that end as well as direct the
development of sub-agreements in specific areas of common endeavor.61
Furthermore, the fourteen Governments adopted a series of principles, stating
that their environmental management activities would reflect, among other
55. Cindy Chaisson, The State of “Polluter Pays” in Canada, NEWS BRIEF (Envtl. Law
Ctr., Edmonton, Alta.), 2005, at 10, 10, http://www.elc.ab.ca/ims/client/upload/PolluterPaysVol.20-1.pdf.
56. Id. See, for example, Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.S.A., ch. E12, § 2(I) (2000) (Alta.); Contaminated Sites Remediation Act, R.S.M., ch. 40, §§ 1(1)(c)(i),
21(a) (1996) (Man.); Environment Act, 1994-95 S.N.S., ch. 1, § 2(c) (N.S.).
57. See 2002 S.S., ch. E-10.21 (Sask.).
58. See id. §§ 4-15.
59. 1994-95 S.N.S., ch. 1, § 2 (N.S.).
60. Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Canada-wide Accord on
Environmental Harmonization (Jan. 28, 1998), http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/accord_
harmonization_e.pdf.
61. Id. at 1.
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principles, that “those who generate pollution and waste should bear the cost
of prevention, containment, cleanup or abatement (polluter pays principle).”62
Federal environmental legislation also expressly or implicitly incorporates
the PPP in a similar pattern to the provinces.63 Most prominent among the
federal references to the PPP is the preamble of the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999, which reads,
Whereas the Government of Canada recognizes the responsibility
of users and producers in relation to toxic substances and pollutants
and wastes, and has adopted the “polluter pays” principle; . . .
Now, therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts
as follows: . . . . 64
The PPP is accepted within the Canadian environmental legislation and is
slowly trickling down through the court system to lower court decisions.
III. The Polluter Pays Principle and Environmental Law
Currently in Canada, the nexus between the PPP and agriculture lies in
environmental legislation and not industry-specific statutes.65 Potentially, at
least, environmental protection provisions, particularly those dealing with
discharges into air, water, and on-land resources, should be applicable to
farming operations. A number of federal and provincial statutes incorporate
the PPP in a manner that could be applied to agricultural activities in the same
manner as it is to other industries.
Section 1(1) of the Environmental Protection Act of Ontario, for example,
defines “natural environment” as “the air, land and water, or any combination
or part thereof”66 and provides, “[n]o person shall discharge into the natural
environment any contaminant, and no person responsible for a source of
contaminant shall permit the discharge into the natural environment of any
contaminant from the source of contaminant, in an amount, concentration or
level in excess of that prescribed by the regulations.”67
Contaminant is defined as “any solid, liquid, gas, odour, heat, sound,
vibration, radiation or combination of any of them resulting directly or
62. Id. at 2.
63. See Canada Environmental Protection Act, 1999 S.C., ch. 33, pmbl. (Can.); Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C., ch. A-12, §§ 6-7 (1985); Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F14, § 42 (1985).
64. 1999 S.C., ch. 33, pmbl.
65. See infra Part IV.
66. Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O., ch. E-19, § 1(1) (1990).
67. Id. § 6(1).
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indirectly from human activities that causes or may cause an adverse effect.”68
The legislation then provides for remedial and preventative orders to address
land, water, property, animal life, plant life, or human health or safety that is
or is likely to be injured, damaged, or endangered as a result of any such
discharge.69 The broad scope of the PPP provisions could encompass farm
related environmental problems including: pesticide spray drift, fertilizer
runoff, soil drift, odours from intensive livestock operations, and green house
gas emissions, to name but a few examples. However, with very few
exceptions, farmers have not traditionally been targeted for enforcement
pursuant to environmental legislation at either the federal70 or the provincial
level.
According to Saskatchewan Environment officials, there has never been a
provincial prosecution of a farmer pursuant to an environmental statute,71 nor
has any agriculturally based project, including intensive livestock operations,
required an environmental assessment in the province.72 This in a province
where approximately 12.6% of the approximately 979,000 residents are farm
based, 35.7% rurally based,73 and where the Environmental Management and
Protection Act, 2002 represents the most progressive and aggressive
environmental legislation in the country.
The federal government, although historically reluctant to prosecute, has
made one major exception as of late to deal with “fish kills” caused by
agricultural activity. Section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act74 prohibits the deposit
into fish-bearing waters of substances that are deleterious or harmful to fish.
The provision has been used to crack down on pesticide runoff problems,
68. Id. § 1(1).
69. Id. §§ 17-18.
70. A review of federal environmental enforcement activities under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act and the federal Fisheries Act reveals that of the approximately
170 prosecutions by the department between 1988 and 2001, none related to agricultural
activities. Environment Canada, Environmental Law Enforcement Program, Reports and
Statistics, Legal Activities Reports (Jan. 1, 1988 - Mar. 31, 1999), http://www.ec. gc.ca/eleale/default.asp?lang=En&n=5C63F879-1.
71. E-mail from Ralph Bock, Environmental Project Officer, Saskatchewan Environment,
to Marie-Ann Bowden, Professor, University of Saskatchewan College of Law (July 10, 2005)
(on file with author). Mr. Bock believes that the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans
has considered action against farmers for interference with fish/fish habitat but that, to date, no
prosecutions laid in the province. Id.
72. E-mail from Larry Lechner, Director of the Environmental Assessment Branch,
Saskatchewan Environment, to Marie-Ann Bowden, Professor, University of Saskatchewan
College of Law (July 10, 2005) (on file with author).
73. StatsCan, Farm Population, By Province (2001 Censuses of Agriculture and
Population: Saskatchewan), http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/agrc42i.htm.
74. R.S.C., ch. F-14, § 36(3) (1985).
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particularly in Prince Edward Island.75 In 2002 it was reported that there were
over 7000 potato fields covering approximately 110,000 acres on the Island.76
Improper application practices led to chemical runoff into waterways
destroying fish and other aquatic life.77 “There have been at least 26 so-called
‘fish kills’ in recent years and 17 rivers have been declared dead throughout
the province, meaning virtually all forms of aquatic life in them have been
wiped out.”78
The rising level of local concern outside of the agricultural community led
to more frequent and rigourous prosecutions than there had been to date.
By way of example, in 2004, a fine of $3500 and a payment of $12,800 to
the federal government’s Environmental Damages Fund were ordered against
a Prince Edward Island potato grower who pleaded guilty of a violation under
Fisheries Act section 36(3).79 This penalty was levied as a result of pesticide
contaminated water and soil runoff into a local waterway, which resulted in a
count of over 4500 dead fish.80 According to the Environment Canada Press
Release which documented the judgment,
The Environmental Damages Fund is rooted in the “polluter pays”
principle. Courts can use the Fund to ensure that compensation is
provided by convicted polluters for the damage that they cause to
the environment. The Fund also gives the court a way to ensure
that financial penalties imposed under the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA 1999) and the Fisheries Act are used
for environmental protection purposes.81
With this notable exception, the failure to prosecute environmental
offenders within the agricultural sector is attributable to two factors. First,
environmental legislation is often subordinate to other statutes, including
statutes administered by the departments of agriculture. In Saskatchewan, for
example, the Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002 (EMPA,
75. Perfect Potato: An Environmental Hazard, Oct. 28, 2002, http://www.pmac.net/
perfect_potato.html.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. News Release, Environment Canada, Potato Grower Sentenced in Fish Kill Case (Sept.
21, 2004), http://www.ec.gc.ca/press/2004/040921_n_e.htm). For earlier case reports, see
FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA, ANNEX 8: ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
POLLUTION PREVENTION PROVISIONS BY ENVIRONMENT CANADA: REPORT ON FY 2000-2001
ACTIVITIES (Apr. 1, 2000 - Mar. 31, 2001), http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/canwaters-eauxcan/
infocentre/publications/reports-rapports/ann00/annex8_e.asp.
81. News Release, Environment Canada, supra note 80.
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2002) provides that “[t]he Minister is responsible for all matters not by law
assigned to any other minister or government agency respecting the
environment and enhancing and protecting the quality of the environment.”82
The powers of the Minister within the Act include remediation of discharges
into the environment83 and the management of surface and groundwater
quality.84 In spite of these powers, the environmental control of intensive
livestock operations (ILO) rests with the provincial Department of
Agriculture.85 As a result, in the event of “immediate danger of pollution of
ground or surface waters” caused by an intense livestock operation (ILO) —
through mismanagement of manure, for example — it is the Minister of
Agriculture, not the Minister of Environment, who may suspend or cancel
approval of a waste management plan.86 Moreover, there is no legislative
provision within the intensive livestock operations statute which imposes civil
liability on the operator should the danger become a reality. At that point the
civil liability provisions of the Environmental Management and Protection Act
may provide some opportunity for compensation for those harmed by the
operation.87
Second, certain agricultural activities may specifically be exempt from
environmental legislation in certain circumstances. For example, every
Canadian province has laws governing the sale, use, transportation, storage,
spill, and disposal of pesticides used in agriculture, forestry, commercial, and
domestic application.88 However, many provinces also exempt farmers from
the rules governing pesticide use, including mandatory education and
training.89
82. 2002 S.S., ch. E-10.21, § 3(1) (Sask.) (emphasis added).
83. Id. §§ 4-36.
84. Id.
85. Agricultural Operations Act, 1995 S.S., ch. A-12.1 (Sask.).
86. Id. § 24(3).
87. EMPA § 15.
88. See, e.g., Pesticide Regulation, 43/1997 (Alta.); Pest and Nuisance Control Regulation,
184/2001 (Alta.); Pesticide Sales, Handling, Use and Application Regulation 24/97 (Alta.);
Pesticide Control Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 360 (1996) (repealed 2003) (B.C.); Integrated Pest
Management Act, 2003 S.B.C., ch. 58 (B.C.); The Pesticides and Fertilizers Control Act,
R.S.M., ch. P40 (1987) (Man.); Pesticides Control Act, R.S.N.B., ch. P-8 (1973) (N.B.);
Environmental Protection Act, 2000 S.N.L., ch. E-14.2, § 9 (Nfld.); Environment Act, 1994-95
S.N.S., ch. 1, pt. 7 (N.S.); Pesticides Act, R.S.O., ch. P.11 (1990) (Ont.); Pesticides Control Act,
R.S.P.E.I., ch. P-4 (1988) (P.E.I.); Loi sur les Pesticides, L.R.Q., ch. P-9.3 (Que.); The Pest
Control Act, R.S.S., ch. P-7 (1978) (Sask.); Pest Control Products (Saskatchewan) Act, S.S., ch.
P-8 (1978) (Sask.).
89. These provinces are: Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. See B.C. Regulations (Pesticide Control Act), 319/81, § 10(2);
DAVID BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
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IV. The Polluter Pays Principle and Agriculture
A. The Context
According to Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, yearly sales of goods and
services from the Canadian agriculture sector amount to more than $83 billion.
Agriculture and agri-food industries represent almost 9% of the Gross
Domestic Product of Canada.90 Seven percent of Canadian exports are
agriculturally based and amount to a total of about $17 billion each year,
representing employment for about two million Canadians.91
In keeping with international trends in the developed world, primary
agriculture92 is increasingly focused on the maximization of commodity
production on fewer and larger, specialized farms. “Major commodity groups
are grains” (in spite of pricing difficulties) “and oilseeds, red meats” (although
the cross-border problems associated with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
has been a blow to the industry), “dairy, horticulture, poultry and eggs, and
forages.”93 Production has increased only marginally over the past decade, but
through efforts to increase value-added production this figure is expected to
grow in step with government and sectoral initiatives.94
The diversity of agricultural production systems across the country, coupled
with the varied factors affecting agriculture in different regions, has led to a
corresponding variation in the degree and severity of environmental issues
affecting the industry across Canada. AAFC reports that
123 (2003). Similarly, Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act exempts animal waste from
provisions prohibiting the release of contaminants. R.S.O., ch. E-19, §§ 6(2), 14(2), 15(2),
91(4) (1990); see also BOYD, supra, at 37 (citing Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 482
(1996) (repealed 2003); Agricultural Waste Control Regulation (Waste Management Act), B.C.
Reg. 131/92, § 2).
90. Specifically, 2.1% farm-level agricultural production, 2.3% processing, and 4.3% food
service and retail transactions. AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., AGRICULTURE IN HARMONY WITH
NATURE: STRATEGY FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD
DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA, at 7 (1997)[hereinafter AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., AGRICULTURE
IN HARMONY WITH NATURE], available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/policy/environment/
pdfs/sds/strat_e.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Primary agriculture generally includes farming in all its branches and specific farming
operations such as the cultivation and tillage of the soil; the production of any agricultural or
horticultural commodities; and the raising of livestock. For a list of specific activities that
constitute “agriculture,” see North American Industry Classification System, 1997 U.S. NAICS
Codes and Titles (July 1998), http://www.census.gov/epcd/naicscod.txt.
93. AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., AGRICULTURE IN HARMONY WITH NATURE, supra note 90,
at 7.
94. Id.
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The environmental risks of agricultural production also vary
significantly as a function of the nature of production, the
environment in which production takes place, and the management
practices employed.
Environmental issues associated with
agriculture and agri-food production include use and management
of agricultural inputs; use and quality of water resources;
management and quality of soil resources; biodiversity in
agroecosystems; climate and air quality issues; and management of
waste, including food packaging.95
For example, agriculturally sourced nitrates are “present in nearly all”
ground water beneath the “intensively farmed regions of Canada.”96
According to David Boyd, non-point sources are the primary cause of water
pollution, with runoff of fertilizers, animal wastes, and pesticides from
agriculture acting as major contributors which “continues to flummox our legal
system.”97 Clearly, if the source of the pollution can be determined —
assuming sustainable practices are not being used, or at a minimum, standards
of reasonable care are not exercised — the PPP should be applicable. Even so,
there are few examples of prosecutions in response to this issue.98 In fairness,
however, the nature of agricultural pollution as primarily a non-point source
has been a major deterrent to regulation and enforcement.99
B. Agricultural Legislation and the PPP
Despite the federal government’s commitment to the polluter pays principle,
there is no specific reference to the PPP in federal agricultural legislation, nor
is there an explicit policy statement adopting the principle. With regard to the
former, AAFC officials100 maintain that the Department itself has little
regulatory authority per se. In their opinion, the legislative powers rest with
Environment Canada, the Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA), and
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA).101
In addition, many view Canada as a “guideline” country where federal and
provincial governments, reluctant to introduce and enforce legislation, prefer
95. Id. at 8.
96. Id. The AAFC maintains that these nitrates are “usually within the safe limit.” Id.
97. BOYD, supra note 89, at 36 (citing ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: CANADA 203 (1995)).
98. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
99. E-mail from Ralph Bock, supra note 71.
100. Interview with an anonymous source within the federal AAFC (July 8, 2005).
101. Although the PMRA and CFIA fall within the Department, both are considered “armslength” agencies.
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instead to work with industry and suggest voluntary guidelines.102 In
Saskatchewan, the Environmental Assessment Act103 makes more than sixteen
references to regulations which “shall be passed” pursuant to the legislation.
Since passage of the legislation in 1980, no regulations have been introduced.
Guidelines and policies have been drafted and redrafted to address
fundamental issues, including the preparation of project proposals.104
Another reason for the failure to incorporate the PPP into agricultural
regulation is that farmland in Canada is primarily privately owned. The
historical sanctity of common law private property rights leaves legislators
reluctant to infringe on rural property interests. This is somewhat surprising
in that, unlike the United States, there is no explicit constitutional protection
of property rights in Canada. Nonetheless, the sentiment is particularly strong
in western Canada where, for example, federal Government efforts to pass
endangered species legislation, including protection of species habitat, took
some twelve years to fully implement after the 1992 signing of the United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.105 The long delay was in no
small part attributable to the opposition of western farmers to any broad
definition of the protected habitat associated with an endangered species.106
Farmers feared losing control over agricultural property hosting such species.
As a result, the Species at Risk Act107 reflects a more conciliatory approach,
which many would argue is ineffective in securing the objectives of the
legislation.
The federal government has also consciously chosen to rely on
voluntary conservation and stewardship initiatives as the primary
approach for habitat protection, especially on private land.
The end result is a law that is largely restricted to federal lands,
aquatic species and migratory birds under the Migratory Birds
Convention Act. The majority of species listed under the Act will
102. See supra note 70 and accompanying ext.
103. 1979-80 S.S., ch. E-10.1 (Sask.).
104. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT BRANCH, SASKATCHEWAN ENV’T, GUIDELINES FOR THE
PREPARATION OF A PROJECT PROPOSAL (July 15, 2003), http://www.se.gov.sk.ca/environment/
assessment/proposal_guidelines_2003.pdf.
105. June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
106. See, for example, the presentation of the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association to the
Federal Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development., Nov. 19, 1996 (on
file with author). For a full discussion of the arguments presented in opposition to the attempts
at federal regulation of endangered species, see LAURA JONES & LIV FREDERICKSON, FRASER
INSTITUTE, CRYING WOLF: PUBLIC POLICY ON ENDANGERED SPECIES LEGISLATION IN CANADA
(1999), available at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=214.
107. 2002 S.C., ch. 29 (Can.); see also GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, SPECIES AT RISK ACT: A
GUIDE (2003), http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/the_act/SARA_guide_oct03_e.pdf.
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only be protected if they are found on federal land — a mere 5% of
Canada outside the territories.108
Historically, any attempt to “subvert” property rights and regulate farmland
through legislative means “must be justified on the grounds that public health
or environmental values are jeopardized or affected by agricultural activities.
As a result, when grappling with environmental problems caused by
agriculture Canada has generally avoided regulatory standards, preferring to
use voluntary programs.”109
There are a few notable exceptions to the general approach. Agriculture
accounts for 90% of the pesticides used in Canada, boasting over $1.4 billion
industry sales annually.110 Canada is normally ranked eighth or ninth in the
world pesticide market, consuming about 3% of the total product.111
According to Statistics Canada, dollars spent on pesticides quadrupled between
1970-1995, with an eighteen-fold increase in land area treated with
herbicides.112 About three-quarters of all croplands are treated with pesticides
and AAFC studies report that a majority of farmers do not follow
recommended practices for applying pesticides.113 According to David Boyd,
at least sixty pesticides approved for use in Canada — including 2,4-D,
lindane, and carbofuran — have been banned in other western countries due
to environmental and health concerns.114 Within the administration of the
Pesticide Management Review Agency (PMRA), the link between pesticides
and environmental and human health has led to a more aggressive approach
toward pollution prevention and polluter liability than is otherwise evident in
AAFC. An example of this approach is the Pesticide Residue Compensation
Act115 which provides compensation to farmers who have used a pesticide in
108. KATE SMALLWOOD, SIERRA LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, A GUIDE TO CANADA’S SPECIES
(2003).
109. BOYD, supra note 89, at 112.
110. For a complete analysis of pesticide use patterns in Canada, see REPORT OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PARLIAMENT OF
CANADA, PESTICIDES: MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (May 2000), http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/ENVI/Studies/Reports/
envi01/04-toc-e.html.
111. AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDE PRICING AND
AVAILABILITY IN CANADA (2003), available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/spb/fiap-dpraa/
publications/pesticide/pest1_e.php.
112. BOYD, supra note 89, at 115-16.
113. Id. (citing AGRIC. AND AGRI-FOOD CAN., MANURE, FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE
MANAGEMENT IN CANADA: RESULTS OF THE 1995 FARM INPUTS MANAGEMENT SURVEY (1998),
available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/spb/fiap-dpraa/publications/manfum/rprt_e.pdf).
114. BOYD, supra note 89, at 115.
115. R.S.C., ch. P-10, § 3.1 (1985).
AT RISK ACT 5

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/2

2006]

THE PPP IN CANADIAN AGRICULTURE

71

accordance with the Pest Control Products Act,116 but whose produce cannot
be sold because it would violate the pesticide residue levels established under
the Food and Drugs Act.117 The legislation incorporates the PPP in a
somewhat backhanded fashion by providing:
5. (1) No payment of compensation shall be made to a farmer
under this Act in respect of a loss suffered by the farmer by reason
of pesticide residue in or on an agricultural product until the farmer
has taken any steps that the Minister considers necessary
(b) to pursue any legal action that the farmer may have against
(i) the manufacturer of the pesticide causing the residue in or on the
product, or (ii) every person responsible for the presence of the
pesticide residue in or on the product
(2) Where he deems it necessary, the Minister may require, as a
condition for the payment of any compensation to a farmer under
this Act, the consent of that farmer for the Minister to pursue on his
behalf any legal action against any manufacturer or person referred
to in paragraph (1)(b).118
Whether motivated by economic or more environmentally based sentiments,
the section, although not explicitly citing the polluter pays principle as the
basis for liability, certainly incorporates the spirit of the PPP. However, even
this provision has rarely been applied.
Similarly, although Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act exempts animal
waste disposed of “in accordance with normal farming practices” from its
provisions relating to the discharge,119 notification,120 and spill of
contaminants,121 the polluting farmer does not go unregulated. After the
Walkerton Commission of Inquiry,122 the province of Ontario passed the
116. R.S.C., ch. P-9 (1985).
117. R.S.C., ch. F-27 (1985).
118. R.S.C., ch. P-10, §§ 5.1, 5.2.
119. R.S.O., ch. E-19, §§ 14(2)(b), 6(2) (1990) (Ont.) (exempting discharges of animal waste
in accordance with normal farming practices and the regulations made under the Nutrient
Management Act, 2002. R.S.O., ch. 4 (2002) (Ont.)).
120. R.S.O., ch. E-19, § 15(2).
121. Id. § 91(4).
122. The Walkerton Commission of Inquiry was established after contamination of drinking
water with E. coli bacteria that led to seven deaths in Walkerton, Ontario in May of 2000. The
problem originated from the infiltration of a town well by bacteria from animal manure. Among
the issues considered by Mr. J. O’Connor were methods of protecting drinking water from
agricultural sources. DENNIS O’CONNOR, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
REPORT OF THE WALKERTON INQUIRY (2002), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.
gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/walkerton/.
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Nutrient Management Act, 2002123 as part of its commitment to province-wide
standards to address the potentially harmful effects of agricultural practices on
the environment. This legislation sets out a comprehensive and integrated
approach to all land-applied materials. This includes the safe disposal of
manure, other agricultural wastes, and commercial fertilizers, as well as other
bio-solids generated by municipal sewage treatment, septage, and pulp and
paper sludge.124 The Ontario Ministry of Agriculture bears responsibility for
farmer training and review of prepared nutrient management plans, while the
Ministry of Environment is responsible for monitoring and enforcement of the
regulations.125 Thus, a provincial officer or the director may order a person to
prevent126 as well as remediate127 any adverse effect.128 In the event of a failure
by the polluter or potential polluter to address the problem, the statute outlines
extensive powers for remediation by the province and recovery of costs from
the polluter,129 neither of which precludes a quasi-criminal prosecution of the
offender under other provisions within the legislation.130
One other notable exception to the “soft-path approach” adopted by
agriculture departments across the country is noxious weeds legislation.131
Motivated by economics, as opposed to environmental concerns, these longstanding provincial statutes impose on land owners or occupiers the duty to
remove nuisance weeds from their property to avoid agricultural
contamination. Saskatchewan’s Noxious Weeds Act132 lists forty-one weed
species which may require removal. The Ontario statute lists twenty-three.133
In this sense, the weeds are considered pollutants for which farmers are
responsible.
C. Civil Action and the PPP in Agriculture
The torts of nuisance, negligence, strict liability, and trespass also import
the PPP into the agricultural community.
123. R.S.O., ch. 4 (2002).
124. Id. § 2.
125. CAN. ENVTL. LAW ASS’N, NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT FAQS (Jan. 2004),
http://www.ecolawinfo.org/WATER%20FAQs/Water%20Quality%20and%20Enviro%20Pr
otect/NutMan.htm.
126. Nutrient Management Act, R.S.O., ch. 4, § 29.
127. Id. § 30.
128. Id. § 30(2)(c).
129. Id. §§ 34-39.
130. Id. § 43(1)(c).
131. See Weed Control Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 487 (1996) (B.C.); Weed Control Act, R.S.O., ch.
W.5 (1990) (Ont.); Noxious Weeds Act, 1984 S.S., ch. N-9.1 (Sask.).
132. Noxious Weeds Act, 1984 S.S., ch. N-9.1.
133. Weed Control Act. R.S.O., ch. W.5.
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Nuisance is the unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment of
property, causing either physical damage to property or substantial interference
with the use and enjoyment of the occupier.134 Agricultural activities, such as
water and air pollution from pesticides or manure,135 soil drift, flies,136 rodents,
and smell,137 have all led to polluter liability pursuant to this tort.
Strict liability, also known as the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,138 has also
successfully reflected the PPP within the Canadian agricultural context, most
notably in cases involving chemical spray drift resulting in crop damage.139 In
addition, liability for the escape from property of something non-natural which
is likely to do mischief if it escapes140 has also extended to stray animals141 in
spite of their seemingly “natural” constitution, but has not included road salt
which leached onto agricultural lands.142
Trespass, the direct physical entry onto the property of another, has been the
subject of litigation relating to aerial spraying in those circumstances where
the airplane actually enters the neighbouring property,143 once again
reinforcing the PPP. The more obvious trespass by cattle has been
substantially modified over the years through municipal and provincial
legislation.144
Negligence has also been found vis-à-vis polluting farm activities, including
the rather novel finding of negligence in relation to the burning of stubble,
which caused reduced visibility on a highway and a consequent multiple-car
accident.145
In spite of the potential application of these torts to agriculture, very few
cases apply these torts in Canada, and none specifically reference the PPP in
their discussion of liability.
134. See generally BETH BILSON, THE CANADIAN LAW OF NUISANCE (1991).
135. Metson & Metson v. DeWolfe Ltd., [1980] 43 N.S.R.2d 221 (N.S. Sup. Ct. (Trial
Div.)).
136. Miller v. Krawitz, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 784 (Man. K.B.).
137. Pyke v. Tri Gro Enters. Ltd., [2001] 55 O.R.3d 257 (Ont. Ct. App.); see also PUB.
LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE FARMER 9 (2000).
138. (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265.
139. See Cruise v. Neissen, [1978] 82 D.L.R. (3d) 190 (Man. Ct. App.); Kwasnuik v. Ratke,
[1966] 57 D.L.R. (2d) 269 (Sask. Q.B.).
140. Rylands, 1 L.R. Exch. at 265.
141. See Acher v. Kerr, [1973] 2 O.R.2d 270 (Ont. County Ct.).
142. Schenck v. The Queen in Right of Ontario, [1981] 34 O.R.2d 595 (Ont. High Ct. of
Justice).
143. Bridges Bros. v. Forest Prot. Ltd., [1976] 14 N.B.R.2d 91 (N.B. Sup. Ct.).
144. See Falardeau v. Church, [1972] 6 W.W.R. 450 (B.C. Sup. Ct.). For legislation, see
Stray Animals Act, R.S.A., ch. S-20 (2000) (Alta.); Animal Liability Act, C.C.S.M., ch. A-95
(1998) (Man.); Stray Animals Act, 1978 S.S., ch. S-60 (Sask.).
145. Lickoch v. Madu, [1973] 34 D.L.R. (3d) 569 (Alta. Sup. Ct. (App. Div.)).
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V. Barriers to the PPP
A. Intensive Livestock Operations
“In Canada, there are more than thirteen million cattle, eleven million pigs,
half a million horses and mules, and close to a million sheep and goats.”146
Over the past twenty years, livestock farming has changed substantially from
an industry based on small producers to one dominated by large agri-business
ventures known in Canada as intensive livestock operations (ILOs).147 Within
the hog sector alone, Statistics Canada reports that the number of hog farms
has decreased by more than 50% during the period 1990-2000. During the
same period of time, the number of hogs per farm has almost tripled.148
Seen as a means of ensuring the long term viability of the rural economy,
provincial governments have fostered ILOs through direct financial assistance,
support of value added support industries like processing plants, and through
legislative enactment.149
Unfortunately, the environmental concerns associated with this industry
have become well known and documented.
In Ontario and Quebec alone, livestock produce a volume of
manure equal to the sewage from 100 million people . . . . The
auditor general of Quebec “found excess spreading [from livestock
operations] to the leading source of non-point source pollution” in

146. BOYD, supra note 89, at 37 (citing ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
ENVIRONMENTAL DATA COMPENDIUM 1999 EDITION 286 (1999)).
147. Also known as CAFOs in the United States.
148. Edward W. Tyrchiewicz, Canadian Perspective, 7 AGRIC. FOOD POL’Y SYS. INFO.
WORKSHOP 225, 226 (2002) (citing STATISTICS CANADA, CAT NO. 23-603-UPE, NUMBER OF
FARMS REPORTING PIGS AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF PIGS PER FARM (2001)), available at
http://www.farmfoundation.org/teal/tyrchniewicz.pdf.
149. The province of Saskatchewan typifies the metamorphosis to factory farming. For a
discussion of this transition, see Cathy Holtslander, Living in a Sea of Cheap Grain: The
Corporate Conversion of Saskatchewan’s Hog Production Policy, SASK. NOTES (Canadian Ctr.
for Policy Alternatives, Saskatoon, Sask.), Dec. 2002, at 1, 1-4. For a discussion of the
relationship between funding of agriculture and environmental sustainability using the province
of Quebec as a case study, see Denis Boutin, Presentation at the Sixth Biennial Conference of
the Canadian Soc’y for Ecological Econ.: Reconciling Farm Support and Environmental
Protection: Trends and Prospects (Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://www.cansee.org/cdocs/
2005/13/DenisBoutin-CANSEEConference-Oct2005.pdf. For a description of ILO legislation
and environmental regulation in Canada (as well as the United States and Mexico), see JERRY
SPEIR ET AL., COMM’N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, COMPARATIVE STANDARDS OF INTENSIVE
LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS IN CANADA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES 53 (2002), available
at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/LAWPOLICY/CAFOs_en.pdf.
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the province. Between 1988 and 1998, there were 274 manure spills
in Ontario, including 53 spills that killed fish. Up to one in three
Canadian livestock farmers stores liquid manure in unlined lagoons,
risking contamination of both surface water and groundwater. . . .
Ontario’s environmental commissioner concludes, “Environmental
laws created when small operations were the norm may not address
the associated environmental risks that come with intensive farm
operations.” Although Canada spends billions of dollars to treat
human sewage, the far greater volumes of animal manure produced
receive no treatment at all.150
The regulation of intensive livestock operations in Canada rests with
provincial governments.151 At a minimum, the operator of a proposed
operation will be required to obtain a building permit from local authorities in
order to undertake construction, and in most jurisdictions the departments of
agriculture are also kept in the loop with detailed information regarding siting
and design of the buildings, manure storage, and manure management
proposals.152 The level of sophistication of such applications and approvals
varies from province to province, as does the necessity for separate review
and/or approval.153
Depending on the province (or sometimes the municipality), the regulation
of ILOs in Canada can be found in legislation, regulation, codes of practice,
standards, guidelines, and/or recommendations. While legislation, regulation,
and bylaws (ordinances in the United States) do have the force of law,
guidelines, standards, policies, and codes do not, although they may be
incorporated into legislation over time.
Whatever form taken, articulating expectations becomes strong evidence of
“normally accepted agricultural practices.”154 An operator who meets formal
standards may be able to use such conformance as a defense against civil
actions or statutory complaints under “right to farm” legislation, and, in the
case of a license or permit, adherence to such approval may also provide the
defense of statutory authority. On the other hand, any guideline, legal or
otherwise, offers a standard of practice to measure ILO performance and, in

150. BOYD, supra note 89, at 37 (footnotes omitted).
151. ONT. MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, A REVIEW OF SELECTED
JURISDICTIONS AND THEIR APPROACH TO REGULATING INTENSIVE FARMING OPERATIONS (June
10, 2003), http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/agops/otherregs2.htm; see also SPEIR ET AL.,
supra note 149, at 67-69.
152. ONT. MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 151.
153. SPEIR ET AL., supra note 149, at 53.
154. See infra note 157; discussion infra Part V.B.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

76

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:53

terms of the polluter pays principle, helps identify the “polluter” in the process
of establishing liability.155
B. Right to Farm Legislation
“Right to farm” legislation should not be underestimated in its ability to
undermine the efficacy of any PPP regime, be it in relation to intensive
livestock production or to other forms of agricultural activity. Every Canadian
province has enacted these statutes, originally designed to protect family farm
operations from the encroachment of urban development.156 The legislation
exempts agricultural operations from liability pursuant to common law
nuisance actions — be it private or public nuisance — so long as the operation
is in accordance with what are considered normal farming practices.157 The
exact phraseology differs from province to province,158 as does the definition
of the term. The standard of “normalcy,” however, is defined either by
government, through statute or regulation, or by the particular agricultural
industry itself, according to accepted practices in the trade.159
Inevitably, the legislation places the burden on those seeking redress from
the polluter by reversing the onus to the party claiming a failure to meet the
155. SPEIR ET AL., supra note 149, at 93-94.
156. For examples of right to farm legislation, see Agricultural Operation Practices Act,
R.S.A., ch. A-7 (2000); Farm Practices Protection Act, C.C.S.M., ch. F 45 (1992) (Man.);
Agricultural Operation Practices Act, 1999 C.S.N.B., ch. A-5.3 (N.B.); Farm Practices Act,
2000 S.N.S., ch. 3 (N.S.) (Nova Scotia is unique in that the legislation also protects farmers
from negligence claims.); Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998 S.O., ch. 1 (Ont.);
Farm Practices Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. F-4.1 (1998) (P.E.I.); An Act Respecting Preservation of
Agricultural Lands and Agricultural Activities, R.S.Q., ch. P-41.1 (1996) (Que.).
157. SPEIR ET AL., supra note 149, at 93; see also Jonathan J. Kalmakoff, “The Right to
Farm”: A Survey of Farm Practice Protection Legislation in Canada, 62 SASK. L. REV. 225
(1999).
158. Although the exact phrase differs from province to province, the “normalcy” standard
is a common theme. In Saskatchewan, for example, § 2(i) of the Agricultural Operations Act,
1995 S.S., ch. A-12.1 (Sask.), defines normally accepted agricultural practice as
an agricultural practice that: (i) is conducted in a prudent and proper manner that
is consistent with accepted customs and standards followed by similar agricultural
operations under similar circumstances, including the use of innovative
technology or advanced management practices in appropriate circumstances; (ii)
is conducted in conformity with any standards established pursuant to the
regulations; and (iii) meets accepted standards for establishment and expansion.
Id.
159. The issue of what constitutes normally accepted practice has been addressed by
Canadian courts. For a enlightening discussion of how that standard is determined (and can
change over time), see Gunby v. Mushroom Producers’ Co-op. Inc. [1999] 31 C.E.L.R. 13 (N.S.
Normal Farm Practices Prot. Bd.); Pyke v. Tri Gro Enters. Ltd., [2001] 55 O.R.3d 257 (Ont. Ct.
App.).
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standard, rather than demanding the operator establish on the balance of
probabilities that the practices are within the standard of “normalcy.”160
Should the plaintiff fail to establish the practices are “not normal,” the operator
of the agricultural activity will not be liable in an action in nuisance, and
neither injunction nor other order of a court will prevent the operator from
carrying on the agricultural operation.161 In other words, the polluter does not
pay.
Unfortunately, this legislation has become a sword, as opposed to a shield
for certain agricultural operations, particularly the intensive livestock industry.
In spite of the existence of what would otherwise be actionable nuisances such
as smells, noise, and other health concerns associated with this agri-industry,
polluters find themselves able to avoid liability through these statutes.162 In
fairness, the industry does not have complete immunity from civil action, as
the operator may still face strict liability, negligence, trespass, or statutory civil
action, should they fail to comply with licensing provisions and damages
result.163 Nonetheless, the existence of right to farm legislation has had a
chilling effect on many neighbours negatively impacted by these activities.164
The original objective of the legislation, to protect the rural operator from the
overly sensitive urban intruder, now protects agri-business from rural
neighbours and, in many cases, undermines the application of the PPP.
In spite of the support lent to this industry by provincial governments
through legislative and other means, the courts have vigilantly reviewed farm
practices.165 Recognizing that “right to farm” legislation clearly erodes the
common law understanding of nuisance and the scope of real property rights,

160. By way of example, the Saskatchewan legislation reads:
The onus of proving that the agricultural operation is causing nuisance arising
from practices that are not consistent with normally accepted agricultural practices
lies on the plaintiff or claimant where the plaintiff or the claimant in an action or
proceeding against an operator claims:
XXx(a) damages in nuisance with respect to the agricultural operation; or
XXx(b) an injunction or other order preventing the continuing operation of the
agricultural operation on the grounds of nuisance.
1995 S.S., ch. A-12.1, § 4.
161. See, e.g., id. § 3(1).
162. For a discussion of the issues associated with ILOs from those opposed to the practice,
see Welcome to Manitoba Hogwatch, http://www.hogwatchmanitoba.org (last visited Jan. 31,
2006).
163. That is, the legislation only provides “immunity” nuisance action and does not act as
a bar to other commonlaw tort actions. See supra Part IV.2.C.
164. Telephone Interview with Cathy Holtslander, Project Organizer for Beyond Factory
Farming, Council of Canadians, in Saskatoon, Sask. (Mar. 27, 2006).
165. See supra note 159.
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the Ontario courts in particular have interpreted right to farm legislation so as
to prevent running roughshod over both.
For example, in the recent case of Pyke v. Tri Gro Enterprises Ltd.166 Mr.
Justice Sharpe for the majority stated:
This Act represents a significant limitation on the property rights
of landowners affected by the nuisances it protects. By protecting
farming operations from nuisance suits, affected property owners
suffer a loss of amenities, and a corresponding loss of property
value. Profit-making ventures, such as that of the appellants, are
given the corresponding benefit of being able to carry on their
nuisance creating activity without having to bear the full cost of
their activities by compensating their affected neighbours. While
the Act is motivated by a broader public purpose, it should not be
overlooked that it has the effect of allowing farm operations,
practically, to appropriate property value without compensation.
It is, of course, open to the legislature to limit individual rights
of property in order to achieve some broader social objective. On
the other hand, it is a well-established principle of statutory
interpretation that if legislation is inconclusive or ambiguous, the
court may properly favour the protection of property rights.167
Although not explicit, the PPP ultimately prevailed.
C. Farm Groups and the PPP
Several Canadian agricultural producer organizations, including the
Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario (CFF)168 and Keystone Agricultural
Producers (KAP),169 seek financial compensation for good stewardship.
Unlike the “provider gets” where the farmer receives compensation for the
provision of environmental services that improve the environment beyond the
standard of good farming practices,170 the Alternate Land Use Services
(ALUS) model which they propose also compensates farmers for nonpolluting activities;171 in other words “a non-polluter is paid” principle.
166. [2001] 55 O.R.3d 257 (Ont. Ct. App.).
167. Id. ¶¶ 75-76 (citation omitted).
168. Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario, http://www.christianfarmers.org (last visited
Jan. 31, 2006).
169. Keystone Agricultural Producers, http://www.kap.mb.ca/contents.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2006).
170. For a discussion of the “provider gets principle” within the EC and U.S. agricultural
context, see Grossman, supra note 8, at 4, 19, 36-37, 48-50.
171. Alternate Land Use Services (ALUS) (Payments for Environmental Goods and
Services), A Policy of the Christian Farmers Federation (Christian Farmers Federation of
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So, for example, efforts to “[r]eplenish and purify water supplies by
enhancing wetlands, planting vegetation along streams and fencing livestock
out of at-risk water supplies” would, under the CFF alternate land use model,
be considered a “deliverable” worthy of “environmental payment.”172 While
some of the suggested deliverables do reflect the provider gets approach, it is
arguable that planting vegetation along streams and fencing livestock to
prevent degradation of water supplies are examples of good farming practices
and preventative measures within the purview of the PPP. Similarly, the
annual “qualifying practices” for compensation proposed by KAP fall within
good management practices and, if not followed as a baseline, should trigger
the polluter pays principle if environmental degradation results. These annual
qualifying practices set out by KAP are:
i) Grazing Management: Use of rotational practices reduces
stocking pressure on tame and native pastures resulting in better
waterfowl and wildlife cover.
ii) Green Manure Crops: The use of biennial or short term
perennial legume crops has good soil improvement [and] also has
positive wildlife benefits. Even annual crops can be used as green
manure crops.
iii) Residue Management: Management of land to enhance crop
residue and use of winter annuals have many positive benefits for
soil and water conservation.173
The supporters of ALUS argue that Europe and the United States already
support their rural communities based on the “policy rationale of paying
farmers for their provision” of ecological services.174 Canadian farmers have
been left to compete without such support. In their view, domestic agricultural
issues are becoming dominated by the environmental agenda, as the urbanites
increasingly demand “new products” like “cleaner water and pastoral
landscapes . . . from rural producers,”175 all without government-supported
resource adjustment and related rural income enhancement programming.

Ontario, Guelph, Ontario), Sept. 28, 2005, http://www.christianfarmers.org/sub_policies_and_
issues/policy_alus_sept_2005.pdf.
172. Id. at 3.
173. KEYSTONE AGRIC. PRODUCERS, ALTERNATE LAND USE SERVICES (ALUS):
BROADENING THE BASE OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME 6, available at http://www.kap.mb.ca/
policy_alus.pdf.
174. Id. at 1.
175. Id.
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“Implementing [ALUS] would recognize the societal benefits from agriculture
beyond the traditional commodities . . . .”176
Although the specific objectives of alternate land use services are laudable,
including: conservation and environmental enhancement, such as greenhouse
gas (GHG)/carbon sequestration; sustainable rural communities; and
agricultural income enhancement and adaptation, the membership maintains
that any and all such programs must be voluntary and based on incentives
acceptable to the individual landowner.177
ALUS is not to be dismissed out of hand: some of the proposals do reflect
the provider gets approach. However, the non-polluter is paid model does run
contrary to the PPP and undermines both policy and legal efforts by
government and other producer-based organizations who support the latter
objective.
VI. The Future of the Polluter Pays Principle in Canada
The recognition and infusion of the PPP in Canadian agriculture has been
slow, but two recent initiatives give reason for optimism. The first is the
coupling of pollution prevention programs (to minimize the need for control
and remediation) with financial incentives for successful stewardship. The
second is a current legal action, partially based on the PPP, which is receiving
both national and international attention.
A. Environmental Farm Planning (EFP) Initiatives
In 2001 the “federal, provincial, and territorial governments [began]
working with the agricultural and agri-food industry to help strengthen and
revitalize the sector” through [the development of an] Agricultural Policy
Framework (APF) . . . .”178 The framework involves “five key elements”
including environment, business risk management, food safety and quality,
renewal, and science and innovation.179 All are designed to assist Canadian
agriculture in the development of new international markets. The signatories
to APF have since completed Implementation Agreements with the federal
Government.180
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id. at 2-5, 6.
178. Putting Canada First, AGRI-INFO (Agric. & Agri-food Can.), Mar. 2003, at 1, 1,
available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/cb/apf/pdf/bull_2003v01_01_e.pdf.
179. Id.
180. In addition, all provinces and territories have agreed to Terms of Reference for an APF
Review Panel, which will assess progress on objectives articulated in the Framework. See
AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY FRAMEWORK (APF) (Feb. 7, 2006),
http://www.agr.gc.ca/cb/apf/index_e.php.
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The APF environment component identifies soil, water, air, and biodiversity
as the main areas requiring the attention of agricultural producers and actively
promotes management practices that enhance stewardship on the farm.181 The
anticipated results are reduction of agricultural risks and provision of benefits
to each of the component areas.182
Specific environmental problems are listed as “key priorities” including:
“health and supply of water,” erosion, “soil organic matter,” “particulate
emissions, odours,” and habitat availability.183 Having established the nature
of the problem, the Framework continues:
24.2 The Parties agree to work, in collaboration with the
agriculture sector and other stakeholders, towards the achievement
of the following common farm environmental management goals:
24.2.1 the completion of a basic agri-environmental scan on all
farms so as to identify farms and regions requiring corrective
action;
24.2.2 the completion of an agri-environmental farm plan or
participation in an equivalent agri-environmental plan for all farms
identified as requiring significant corrective action under the basic
agri-environmental scan referred to in clause 24.2.1; and
24.2.3 the implementation of agri-environmental farm plans or
equivalent agri-environmental plans and improved stewardship
through the adoption of environmentally beneficial practices, as
appropriate to the needs and circumstances of individual farms or
regions, in the following areas:
Nutrient Management . . .
Pest Management . . .
Land and Water Management . . .
Nuisance Management . . .
Biodiversity Management . . . .184
Interestingly, the Framework makes all of these goals voluntary.185

181. AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., P UTTING CANADA FIRST: AN ARCHITECTURE FOR
AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2, 3 (2005), available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/cb/
apf/index_e.php?section=info&group=consult&page=consult1_03.pdf.
182. Federal-Provincial-Territorial Framework Agreement on Agricultural and Agri-food
Policy for the Twenty-First Century § 24.1, June 2004, available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/cb/
apf/pdf/accord_e.pdf.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 24.2.
185. Id. § 24.3.
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To further these goals, the parties agree to support the development and use
of agri-environmental scans and agri-environmental farm plans.186 The
province of Ontario has since committed $67.66 million to support producers
with the implementation and development of EFPs in that province and to
provide an incentive program “to help producers more quickly adopt the
environmentally beneficial actions needed to reduce the risks and enhance the
benefits identified in the plans.”187 The other provinces and territories have
made similar commitments.188
Similarly, the federal government has quickly moved beyond the
implementation agreements, establishing the National Environmental Farm
Planning Initiative (NEFPI) and the National Farm Stewardship Program
(NFSP) to provide the technical and financial support to follow up on
individual plan recommendations and ensure that beneficial management
practices are adopted within agriculture. Producers who complete a
government-reviewed EFP are eligible to apply for financial and technical
assistance through provincially189 delivered programs.190 A maximum of
186. Id. § 24.2. A
“basic agri-environmental scan” means a tool used to identify those farms
requiring corrective environmental action, based on a preliminary examination of
key agricultural factors that may pose environmental risks or provide benefits to
air, soil, water, and biodiversity; an “agri-environmental farm plan” means a
process: a) used to conduct a systematic and comprehensive assessment that
identifies all actual and potential environmental risks and benefits from
agricultural operations, and b) used to develop a plan of action to mitigate priority
risks and realize benefits, and c) will include independent review and
documentation covering progress and data on implementation.
Id. § 23.1.
187. AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., BACKGROUNDER: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CANADA-ONTARIO
IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.agr.gc.ca/cb/index_e.php?s1=
b&s2=2003&page=n31211b.
188. See the federal-provincial and federal-territorial agreements at http://www.agr.gc.ca/
cb/apf/index_e.php?section=info&page=frame.
189. “Funding levels and criteria for each [programme] can vary from province to province.
Federal incentive levels also vary between . . . categories. Federal cost share levels are either
30% or 50% and maximum project funding limits apply to each . . . category.” AGRIC. & AGRIFOOD CAN., THE NATIONAL FARM STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM (Aug. 9, 2005), http://www.agr.gc.
ca/env/efp-pfa/index_e.php?page=nfsp-pnga.
190. Take up on the program has been very positive. In Saskatchewan for example, since
its inception this past spring, just over 650 environmental farm plans have been approved for
funding. The goal is to approve 6000-7000 projects by the end of the funding period in March
2008. To date, over 1300 producers have taken part in the first planning workshops. Bruce
Cochrane, Environmental Farm Plan Program Well Accepted By Saskatchewan Farmers,
FARMSCAPE, Sept. 7, 2005 (Episode 1905), http://archives.foodsafetynetwork.ca/animalnet/
2005/9-2005/animalnet_sept_7.htm#story1.
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$30,000 in federal funding over the life of the NFSP is available to each
operator.191
According to the manager of the federal agricultural stewardship program,
environmental farm planning has now become an integral part of the
Agricultural Policy Framework objective “to confirm . . . Canada’s role as a
world leader in environmentally responsible agriculture.”192 As a result, the
preventative aspect of the PPP should become the norm across Canada,
involving the federal and provincial governments, farm organizations, and
individual operators.
The benefits of EFPs and best management practices in agriculture have
also manifested themselves in agri-finance; private financial institutions are
demanding the completion of increasingly sophisticated environmental site
assessments to determine risk prior to financing decisions. Quite simply,
agricultural producers who fail to ensure the long term environmental viability
of their operations, or who might already fall within the category of “polluter,”
will fail to receive financing.193 Although legislative protection may be
available for lending institutions to limit their own liability should the secured
property be contaminated,194 these lenders are understandably careful to make
certain the real property will have mortgage value.
Whether direct or indirect, carrot or stick, the financial implications
associated with bad environmental practices are leading to changes at the
farmyard level. Either farmers pay to remediate environmental problems, or

191. AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., NATIONAL FARM STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM (NFSP) (Nov.
24, 2005), http://www.agr.gc.ca/progser/ps_nfsp_e.phtml.
192. Jim Tokarchuk, Foreword to AGRIC. & AGRI-FOOD CAN., ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTAL
FARM PLAN FOR PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND (2004).
193. In the case of a major Canadian bank, an Environmental Inspection Report must be
prepared once a year for loans over $250,000. EIRs are not required for loans under $100,000.
With loans over $100,000 and up to $250,000, an EIR is completed only at the time of
application, unless there is a change in circumstances. According to the bank, the impetus for
these requirements was a due diligence requirement under legislation. The first level EIRs are
completed by the bank’s agriculture department. If there is a risk involved or suspected, the
bank will request a level II evaluation from a third party. If the property is a “family farm” in
the traditional sense, a level II evaluation is rarely required; it is, however, common to Agribusiness operations. Telephone Interview with Leo Zyerveld, Regional Agriculture Manager,
Prairie Region, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, in Calgary, Alta. (Sept. 1, 2005).
194. See, e.g., Environmental Management Protection Act, 2002 S.S., ch. E-10.21, §
2(w)(viii) (Sask.) (excluding from the definition of a “person responsible for a discharge” a
“secured creditor . . . unless the secured creditor participated in the day-to-day management or
control of the land or through an act or omission caused the discharge or aggravated an existing
adverse effect”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

84

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:53

they anticipate and prevent pollution through planning and management
practices and receive positive incentives for their actions.195
B. Civil Action
Just as the snail in the ginger beer introduced manufacturers to consumer
liability,196 so too the Canadian case of Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada Inc.197
will force agri-business, and perhaps individual farmers, to recognize the
liabilities associated with adverse environmental impacts and the polluter pays
principal. The case illustrates the legal avenues, both common law and statute
based, available to bring the PPP to the farmyard.198 Its significantly high
profile will ensure that the ruling will receive attention both within Canada and
abroad.
Hoffman and Beauboin, the nominal plaintiffs in this case, are certified
organic farmers residing in Saskatchewan who represent the Saskatchewan
Organic Directorate (SOD), a group of some 1000 organic grain farmers
registered between 1996-2001.199 They are suing Monsanto, Canada, and
Bayer Cropscience Inc.200 for damages associated with “the extensive GMO
[genetically manufactured organism] contamination of canola by genes
introduced into the environment.”201 They also seek an injunction to prevent
the unconfined commercial release of genetically manufactured (GM) wheat.202
The defendants introduced GM canola into the Canadian market after
receiving approval for its unconfined release from the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency in 1995.203 Because both Roundup Ready (Monsanto) and
Liberty Link (Bayer) varieties of canola are open pollinated, cross pollination
occurred with non-GM canola.204 This cross pollination, coupled with the
reproduction of progeny as volunteers, spread the GM product beyond the
195. Interview with Darlene Sanford, President, PEI Cattlemen’s Association, in MontCarmel, P.E.I. (Aug. 8, 2005).
196. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.).
197. [2005] 264 Sask. R. 1 (Sask. Q.B.).
198. For a thorough discussion of the causes of action, see Jane Matthews Glenn, Genetically
Modified Crops in Canada: Rights and Wrongs, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 281 (2003).
199. Certification for the class is sought pursuant to the provincial Class Actions Act., 2001
S.S., ch. C-12.01 (Sask.).
200. Formerly Aventis Cropscience Canada Holding Inc. See also BAYER, ANNUAL REPORT
2002, available at http://www.bayer.com/annualreport2002/subgroups/cropscience1.html.
201. Hoffman, [2005] 264 Sask. R. ¶ 39 (citing The Statement of Claim in the Court of
Queen’s Bench, Judicial Centre of Saskatoon ¶¶ 43-44, available at
http://www.saskorganic.com/oapf/pdf/stmt-of-claim.pdf).
202. See id. ¶ 24.
203. Id. ¶ 9.
204. Id. ¶ 11.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/2

2006]

THE PPP IN CANADIAN AGRICULTURE

85

property of original cultivation.205 As a result, organic farmers in the province
can no longer guarantee that canola grown as “organic” is free from GM
canola seed contamination. Canola as an organic crop has been lost to
certified organic farmers as neither the domestic nor the foreign market accept
products which cannot be warranted as free of GMO contamination.206
The defendants ground their common law claims in negligence, nuisance,
the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,207 and trespass.208 They also claim damages
pursuant to statutory civil actions within the now-repealed Environmental
Management and Protection Act,209 the Environmental Management and
Protection Act, 2002,210 and the province’s Environmental Assessment Act.211
The first hurdle for the plaintiffs was to establish the certified organic
farmers group as a “class” within the meaning of the Saskatchewan Class
Actions Act.212 The certification hearing, held in the fall of 2004, addressed
five questions:
1. Do the pleadings disclose a cause of action?
2. What are the common issues between the members of the class?
3. Is there an identifiable class of persons?
4. Is class action the preferable procedure for the resolution of the common
issues?
5. Is the representative plaintiff appropriate?213
Mme Justice Smith’s decision of May 11, 2005,214 “provide[d] a detailed
analysis of the certification process under Saskatchewan’s class action regime
and guidance as to how the Saskatchewan courts will approach certification
applications.”215 Although the discussion on issues two through five offered
considerable guidance on class actions,216 of greater importance in determining

205. Id.
206. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Statement of Claim, supra note 201, ¶¶ 26-27). The injunction vis-à-vis
GMO wheat seeks to limit the unconfined release of that seed for fear of a similar result.
Statement of Claim, supra note 201, ¶¶ 30-31, 45.
207. (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265.
208. Hoffman, [2005] 264 Sask. R. ¶¶ 125-33.
209. Environmental Management and Protection Act, 1983-84 S.S., ch. E-10.2 (Sask.).
210. Id. ch. E-10.21.
211. Id. ch. E-10.1.
212. Class Actions Act, 2001 S.S., ch. C-12.01 (Sask.).
213. Id. § 6.
214. Hoffman v. Monsanto Can. Inc., [2005] 264 Sask. R. 1 (Sask. Q.B.).
215. Ogilvy Renault, L.L.P., A Rigorous Approach to Certification — The Saskatchewan
Experience, June 30, 2005, http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/en/ResourceCenter/ResourceCenter
Details.aspx?id=993&pId=53.
216. Mme Justice Smith held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy any of these criteria.
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the direction of the PPP in Canada was her treatment of the first question:
whether the statement of claim disclosed a cause of action.217
Mme Justice Smith addressed each of the substantive causes of action
before concluding that the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of
action in relation to negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and trespass.218 She
held that only the statutory actions under the EMPA 2002 and the EAA
disclosed reasonable causes of action.219 She reached this conclusion in spite
of the widely accepted “plain and obvious test” applied to such determinations
as set out in Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.220 This text requires that, presuming
the alleged facts are true, it is plain and obvious that a cause of action exists.
It does not necessitate consideration of the merits of the action, only that a
cause of action exists following a “generous” reading of the Statement of
Claim.221 In spite of this seemingly low threshold, Mme Justice Smith was
unable to find a reasonable cause of action.
Because many of the claims “[were] at least in some respect novel”222 and
required expansion of the doctrine at issue, Mme Justice Smith held it was
within her jurisdiction to determine whether any such novel claim had “a
reasonable prospect for success.”223 On this basis, the common law actions
were untenable.
On August 30, 2005, Mr. Justice Cameron of the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal granted leave to appeal.224 In granting leave, Mr. Justice Cameron
217. For a more detailed discussion of the decision, see Martin Z. P. Olszynski, Hoffman v.
Monsanto Canada Inc.: Looking for a Generous Approach to the Elephant in the Garden, 16
J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 53 (2005); Randy Sutton, A Rigorous Approach to Certification — The
Saskatchewan Experience: Case Comment on Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada Inc., LAW. WKLY.,
July 8, 2005, at 8; Ogilvy Renault, L.L.P., supra note 215.
218. Hoffman, [2005] 264 Sask. R. ¶ 194. Her determination with regard to nuisance was
“subject only to the very remote possibility that the claim can be linked to a failure on the part
of the defendants to comply with the environmental protection requirements of the EMPA, 2002
of the EAA.” Id. J. Smith was of the view that, in such a case, an action in common law
nuisance would be entirely redundant. Id.
219. For a discussion of the possible role of EMPA & EMPA, 2002 in furthering the claims
of organic farmers, see Jodi McNaughton, GMO Contamination: Are GMOs Pollutants Under
the Environmental Management and Protection Act?, 66 SASK. L. REV. 183 (2003).
220. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, 980 (Can.), cited in Hoffman, [2005] 264 Sask. R. ¶ 27.
221. Hoffman, [2005] 264 Sask. R. ¶ 28 (citing WARD BRANCH, CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA
4-1 to 4-2 (Canada Law Book Inc., 2004) (1996)).
222. Id. ¶ 36.
223. Id.
224. Hoffman v. Monsanto Can. Inc. (Hoffman II), [2005] 17 C.E.L.R.3d 139 (Sask. Ct.
App.); see also Media Release, Sask. Organic Directorate, Organic Farmers Granted Leave to
Appeal Class Certification Decision (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.saskorganic.
com/oapf (follow “30 August, 2005 — Leave to appeal granted Press Release” hyperlink).
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stated, “the proposed appeal raises some comparatively new and potentially
controversial points of law, that it transcends the particular in its implications,
and that it is of sufficient importance to the practice pertaining to this subject
to warrant attention by this Court.”225
Clearly the issue of liability for GM products offers ample fodder for legal
debate regarding the scope and application of our common law causes of
action. Whether Hoffman proves to be the vehicle for broadening the scope
of any of these torts remains to be seen. Recent intervener activity, however,
would suggest that the “novel” issues which Justice Smith addressed in her
Queen’s Bench decision, may become the focal point of appeal.226 The social
justification for extending the parameters of these torts could be partially
rooted in the polluter pays principle. If, for example, the unreasonable
interference with use and enjoyment of property contemplated in nuisance can
extend to the “contamination” of the GM canola, the PPP will be re-enforced
within the agricultural sector. Mme Justice Smith acknowledged that the test
for what constitutes a nuisance is “notoriously vague and changes over
time.”227 Indeed, case law has shown that the doors of nuisance are never
closed, expanding into areas like interference with broadcast signals228 and
vibration.229 The willingness of the Court to consider the nuisance claim as
novel yet arguable may introduce the PPP to agricultural enterprises engaged
in GM production. Similar policy arguments can be made with regard to
Rylands v. Fletcher, negligence, and, to a lesser degree, trespass. Whether the
policy arguments will tip the scales is debatable as substantial difficulties
remain.230 However, at a minimum, the debate may inspire change to
incorporate the PPP into agricultural activities in a more comprehensive way.

225. Hoffman, [2005] 17 C.E.L.R.3d 139 ¶ 16. The majority of Mr. Justice Cameron’s
decision discussed the standard applied by Mme Justice Smith to the certification application
and determined that the issue of rigour warranted consideration by the Court of Appeal. Id. ¶¶
1-15.
226. Interview with confidential source (Dec. 8, 2005).
227. Hoffman, [2005] 264 Sask. R. ¶ 108.
228. Nor-Video Serv. Ltd. v. Ont. Hydro, [1978] 84 D.L.R. (3d) 221 (Ont. Sup. Ct., High
Ct. of Justice).
229. Mandrake Mgmt. Consultants Ltd. v. Toronto Transit Comm’n, [1993] 102 D.L.R. (4th)
12 (Ont. Ct. App.).
230. For example, although Mme Justice Smith endorses the proposition that the creator of
the nuisance (in our scenario the “polluter”) need not necessarily be in occupation of the land
from which the nuisance emanates nor exhibit independent malfeasance in order to face
liability, she held that, at a minimum, direct causation of damage must be alleged. In this case,
there were no facts alleging that the defendants substantially caused the nuisance alleged. As
a result the cause of action was untenable. Hoffman, [2005] 264 Sask. R. ¶ 122.
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VII. Conclusion
Although accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada and within the
Canadian psyche, the PPP is not a principle which is fully operational in the
farmyard. This is attributable to:
– the lack of private actions against farm-based polluters;
– the general reluctance of public prosecutors to enforce environmental
legislation and pursue polluters within the agricultural sector;
– barriers presented by legislation which have discouraged private action;
and
– the policies and programs of departments of agriculture which have
promoted a cooperative and proactive approach to pollution prevention as
opposed to pollution abatement within agriculture.
In spite of Canada’s history, the incorporation of the polluter pays principle
into agricultural law will not come easily, but it will come. The impetus will
stem from within. At present, fledgling efforts from government through
environmental legislation and agricultural sustainability initiatives are
changing the culture within the agricultural sector. These efforts are
supplemented by the efforts of individuals involved in environmental farm
planning and other legal and non-legal initiatives which are pushing the PPP
forward. Be it common law tort, statutorily based rights to civil action, or the
vocal opposition against those who fail to recognize and meet their
responsibilities under the PPP, individuals are taking polluters to task.
Positive reinforcement from financial institutions and government rewards the
enlightened majority within the agricultural sector who promote the PPP as the
new agricultural reality. The psyche is changing, from both the bottom up and
the top down.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/2

